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Abstract 
Can a robot waste a day away watching clouds? Aesthetics as a means to approach the world 
is a form of control until recently limited to humans. This essay uses two works by New 
Zealand artist Douglas Bagnall to examine the relationship between machines, information 
and aesthetics. In it I discuss how Bagnall’s Film-making Robot (2004) and Cloud Shape 
Classifier (2006) are examples of aesthetic machines that, rather than being defined by 
information, repetition and the digital specificity of the pixel or the binary, are characterised 
by an aesthetic dynamism formed between mutation and emergence. Building on the recent 
identification of ‘new aesthetics’, I argue that processes of emergence and mutation 
contribute a new way to think about machines, information, humans and aesthetics. Finally, I 
suggest that Bagnall’s works do not just demonstrate machinic vision but prefigure a move in 
contemporary art from the stable aesthetic object to the unstable and impure real-time process 




aesthetics, new aesthetics, real-time, information, machine, emergence, mutability, digital. 
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Cloud Watching Robots: Douglas Bagnall’s machine aesthetics. 
 
Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier.  
PIERRE BOURDIEU – Distinction (1984) 
 
When Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten defined “sensuous materiality” (Pietz, 1996, 
p.197) as key to the domain of enlightened experience, humans found themselves at the 
centre of a self-contained aesthetic universe. Debates around the control of taste were 
focused by a narrow system of possibilities; art could either take viewers inside of 
themselves (beauty), or conversely allow them to move outside of their limited 
understanding of the world (sublime). How far one could travel in either direction was 
regarded as an indication of the refinement of one’s taste. This melodramatic 
oversimplification of eighteenth century aesthetics should not really have a place in an 
essay about robots, information, machines and looking, and yet its obvious constraints 
are perhaps the reason why this model of Western aesthetic thought persists. It has 
resulted in a definition of art that is either a universal position paradoxically only 
understood by a very few, or, part of closely held individual and personal affirmations. In 
the early twenty-first century the escape from these aesthetic hierarchies has not been 
straightforward. For example, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1984) demonstrates 
that as soon as humans draw on a notion of beauty in order to get a sexually explicit film 
reclassified as an ‘art’ film, or when a photograph of a naked girl exhibited in a public art 
gallery is defended by curators and critics against popular outcry, we find ourselves 
reinforcing (once again) the connections between taste, knowledge, power and reason 
and their separation from everyday experience and understanding. These aesthetic 
practices remain engrained in contemporary thought and experience (Ranciére 2006). 
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Aesthetics as a means to approach the world around us is a means of control apparently 
limited to human individuals. But recently writers have begun to ask: what if the 
individual looking at the art is not a human but a robot? Is there a ‘new aesthetic’ that is 
connected to digital materials and the way that machines look? Can a robot appreciate 
art, or sense pleasure? Can a robot waste a day away watching clouds? 
 
In the late Eighteenth century it was the leisured classes who had time to watch clouds 
and hone their aesthetic judgements at public art galleries. Just a few years before Kant 
wrote “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” the Swiss watchmaker 
Pierre Jaquet-Droz had built a series of automaton. Jaquet-Droz’s automata were magical 
figures that stood in for humans. Surviving today are a pianist and a writer; each 
automata is occupied by a skilled activity that mimics that undertaken by a 
knowledgeable and refined human individual, (neither of the automata have the time to 
look up from their labour and gaze at the clouds). The concept of a robot as a slave or 
servant did not emerge for a further 150 years. In 1920 Czech playwrights Josef and 
Karel Capek imagined a group of robots originally intended for servitude, who develop 
both desire and resistance and eventually rise up to destroy humanity. Early in Act 1 of 
Rossum’s Universal Robots Helena Glory a representative of the Humanity League raises 
the possibility of robot aesthetics. She suggests that the Robots might receive wages in 
order to ‘buy … what they need … what pleases them.’ Helman the chief-psychologist 
for the Robots replies: ‘That would be very nice, Miss Glory, only there’s nothing that 
does please the Robots. Good heavens what are they to buy? … They’ve no interest in 
anything, Miss Glory … No passion. No soul.’ (1961, p.22). Rossum’s Robots are 
designed to take care of the drudgery of industrial life, enabling humans to live a life that 
is freer and in which ‘Everybody will live only to perfect himself.’ (1961, p.25). 
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The Capeks did not record robots looking at clouds or making artworks; these 
developments in machine aesthetics were left for later generations.  
 
Recently, questions have been asked: what happens when machines make art (Dohm and 
Stahlhut, 2007)? Are we amidst a new aesthetic image revolution (Bridle, 2012; 
Goodbun, 2012)? What is it like to be a bonobo or a satellite or a pixel (Bogost, 2012)? 
If machines began making art in 2007, then in 2013 they seem to have shifted towards 
the generation of machine aesthetics via what has been termed the ‘new aesthetic’. The 
new aesthetic is more than a general cultural condition, but a combination of digital 
machines (as formed through properties, capacities and tendencies (DeLanda, 2011 p.5)) 
and humans who watch and experience these machines over time.  
 
The emergent aesthetic relationship between human and machine is crucial for the 
discussion presented in this essay. Aesthetics remain a way to articulate human 
relationships with the world around us, and historically humans have created many 
machines to look at the environment on our behalf. These are traditional aesthetic 
machines; tools that assist humans in their pursuit of aesthetic pleasures. They are 
machines that are looked through rather than at. The new aesthetic implies that there is 
now a level of decision-making, if not consciousness to the machines as they look. The 
kinds of robot machines considered in this essay use learnt human aesthetics to 
apparently develop their own aesthetic sensibility. This is what I term machine 
aesthetics; a particular kind of aesthetics that is shared between human and machine. If 
these machines can overcome their obedience to informational structures and begin to 
independently consider their environment then we are experiencing a shift in the social 
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and power structures that have hitherto informed aesthetics. A newly mutated machine 
aesthetics leads to the suggestion that what has emerged in the twenty-first century is an 
aesthetics that is understood not just by humans, but by machines that look and are 
sensitive to this look. 
 
The remainder of this essay will examine two networked digital installations by New 
Zealand artist Douglas Bagnall. First I will introduce each of the works and their 
operations. Bagnall’s Film-making Robot (2004) and Cloud Shape Classifier (2006) 
demonstrate how a machine aesthetic forms, what it is, and where it might be located. 
These works produce encoded aesthetic experiences that re-distribute sensory power 
relations between human and non-human. They rely on the technologies of the digital but 
operate through the techniques of art’s histories. In both works digital machines are 
guided towards independent aesthetic judgements and humans must share their 
knowledge, and thus the control, of aesthetic realms with them. Although they appear to 
operate at a distance to humans, they suggest a more complex and impure relationship 
where aesthetic understandings are shared, and emerge between human and machine. 
Bagnall employs an approach to digital art that (like the histories of information theory 
he draws on) insists on a playful commitment to intrusions, interference, and impurity. 
The works are fluid and unpredictable, but not accidental. 
 
In discussion of these works I will contend that Bagnall has constructed a machine 
aesthetic that goes further than that suggested by the ‘new aesthetic.’ To do this I will 
trace a history of the relations between digital matter and information. Beginning with 
the definition of information by Claude Shannon in the 1940s I will end with the shifting 
definitions of emergence presented by Katherine Hayles and Manuel DeLanda 
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respectively. Drawing on echoes found within this pre-history I will show how Bagnall’s 
works generate a machine aesthetics via continuous dynamism and emergence, what I 
will term ‘mutability’. Finally in describing the mutability of these works I will show 
how new aesthetics do not just involve the recognition of machinic vision, but contribute 
a particular way to understand the movement that is occurring in contemporary art from 
stable aesthetic objects to unstable and impure real-time processes. 
 
The Film-making Robot 
 
Bagnall’s Film-making Robot is not really a robot at all. Its eyes are part of a device that 
travels through Wellington, New Zealand’s capital city, on public transport. It films what it 
sees and makes use of existing telecommunications networks to download and edit this 
footage into short films that reflect the particularities of the city. Wellington has a substantial 
free wireless network called caféNET. When passing by a wireless node the robot downloads 
its footage. At night the robot ‘dreams’, and in the process of dreaming edits together the 
recorded footage to make that day’s film. Using its classical training in aesthetics the robot 
assesses each frame and compiles a final work (with credits) that is uploaded to the Internet. 
On his website Bagnall (2004) describes the work as follows: 
This robot makes short films based on its visual experience. Its eyes travel about the city on buses 
while the body sits in a gallery. The eyes collect snippets of video, and transmit them to the body when 
their buses come within range of a Cafenet wireless Internet node. 
(http://www.cafenet.co.nz/zones/wellington/map/). The robot body splits the video into individual 
frames and analyses each one, obtaining twenty numbers reflecting the arrangement of colour, shape 
and detail within the frame. 
The process of filmmaking is distributed between the robot’s eyes that travel the city and the 
robot’s mind located on a networked server in a gallery. Gathered information travels 
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between robot eyes and mind through wireless networks. The network upon which the work 
is constructed (and that is created by the work’s operations) is particular and local, dependant 
on bandwidth, the circulation of public transport, and the generation of shared viewing 
experiences. The network is essential to the storage, action, control, distribution, and creation 
of the work. The robot’s films reflect something of this digital dependence. [1] 
 
The films made by the Film-making Robot have a point of aesthetic finality or completion, as 
the robot creates films that fit its own studies in aesthetics and then shares them with a gallery 
audience as finished works. Each day as it travels city streets the robot records hours of 
footage. At night it translates this information into film. The robot ‘dreams’ its films, finding 
them printed and distributed as it wakes. As Bagnall says: ‘I used to be a film maker, now I 
help robots to make films.’ Bagnall (2004) integrates technical processes within the 
description of the robot itself. To make a film the Film-making Robot 
splits the video into individual frames and analyses each one, obtaining twenty numbers reflecting the 
arrangement of colour, shape and detail within the frame. These numbers are treated as coordinates in a 
twenty dimensional space, in which distance is somewhat related to visual difference. For twelve hours 
a day the robot traces a zigzagging path through this space. This path passes through a series of images, 
which become a video sequence. … At the end of the day the robot looks over its days work and joins 
the best parts together as a finished film. 
The Film-making Robot does not demonstrate artificial intelligence, but machine learning. 
All its training is based on the nature of the human aesthetic experience, its technique born 
from repetition. In order to be able to translate and edit its images, the robot was trained using 
a narrow and particular selection of fine art images gathered from the web; with a majority 
being impressionist paintings from ‘ibiblio’ (http://www.ibiblio.org/wm/paint/auth) and some 
contemporary and New Zealand art. Because the robot can only think one frame at a time, the 
compositional forms it learns from are those of the still image – the painting – rather than 
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those of film. Secondly, a human trainer worked with the robot. Dividing the images 
produced by the robot into sets of ‘good, bad and neither,’ he trained the robot’s network to 
like the good ones and dislike the bad ones. Three further heuristics were then employed: 
‘enthusiast’, the network was encouraged to start fresh each day and improve on past 
experience; ‘away from mean’, where the robot’s preference tended toward images on the 
edge of space; and, ‘away from recents’, resulting in the generation of a dislike for waypoints 
similar to ones recently used. These criteria constitute the robot’s ‘dreaming’. This process of 
working across and between different criteria whether within the individual frame or in the 
frame’s relation to other frames is comparable to the human process of editing film. Both 
machines and humans learn aesthetic criteria through repetition and experience. Bagnall 
(2004) describes the dreaming process: 
Visitors to the gallery can see this video, called variously the robot's “dream” or “stream of 
consciousness”. … The robot uses neural networks and heuristic rules to choose waypoints for its daily 
dream, but the finished film is mainly selected for the smoothness of its movement through the space. 
The robot will remember everything it sees until it has five million images in its mind, after which it 
will replace its least favourite images with new ones. In addition to getting images from the eyes, the 
robot creates false memories by combining and manipulating well-liked and overused images. These 
notes are incomplete. 
Bagnall highlights the close relationship between processes of information transmission and 
aesthetics. Because only its eyes can move, the robot’s technique also shares much with 
Plato’s discussion in the Republic of prisoners who mistake the shadows on the cave wall in 
front of them as ‘real’. When finally released from the cave the prisoners are unable to equate 
what they see with anything they know or recognise. Film theorist Jean-Louis Baudry (1976) 
used Plato’s story to develop his model of the cinematic apparatus. Bagnall (2004) makes the 
filmic apparatus of the robot explicit: ‘the robot lives in a cave and only sees the shadows of 
images of the real world. The shadows look like numbers.’ At the end of each day, the Film-
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making Robot employs a second set of criteria to compose the final film for screening in the 
gallery. This second application of criteria looks at the film from a meta-perspective, tending 
toward the creation of softness and steadiness of change in the film. Here the Film-making 
Robot takes on the role of director, or auteur, no longer simply editing but imposing an 
apparently subjective sense of flow, repetition and potential narrative to the work. In this 
integrated aesthetic body, the Film-making Robot fulfils one of cinema’s utopian dreams, 
where the entire apparatus of filming and screening is incorporated within one auteur body 
(albeit distributed) (Vertov, 1984). In the process of film making the robot shifts its 
perception from a representational approach to the image to a compositional one. In 
representational mode the Film-making Robot looks at the surface of each frame and selects 
or rejects the frame for its validity within the aesthetic criteria it has learnt from humans. 
When it shifts into its compositional mode the Film-making Robot has the potential to 
introduce new contextual combinations of its own. The results of its aesthetic decisions are 
emergent, dynamic and unpredictable.  
 
It is through the compositional tools of digital translation (turning numbers into images) that 
the robot is able make films. As a mechanical device that both receives information (like the 
human viewer in the art gallery, or in its case, on the streets of Wellington) and presents the 
information (the recording and creation of the films) the Film-making Robot seems to be able 
to inhabit multiple representational frameworks. This is the paradox of the Film-making 
Robot: is the robot really able to compose or does it merely represent and repeat? Is it 
enacting the properties of the digital, or does it extend its capacities into affective and 
material relationships? If time and space are materials for the generation of aesthetic 
experiences and if these materials are assessed by way of learnt aesthetic criteria; the robot 
would seem to do more than repeat its lessons. It is more than a performer trapped within 
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controlled representational structures. The robot stockpiles time and transmits image. In this 
it composes. The Film-making Robot makes films by engaging with the digital materials of 
pattern and repetition in order to generate works that human viewers experience aesthetically.  
As well as being an aesthetic machine, it is a machine for aesthetics. And as a machine for 
aesthetics the robot creates understandable and recognisable aesthetic objects for its human 
audience.  
 
The robot makes films that humans can not. It has its own aesthetic that despite the 
predictability, repetition and specificity of its neural system, remains dynamic, mutable and 
emergent to the viewer. As a film-maker, the robot repetitively introduces and works with 
what appear to many human viewers to be noise and dissonance. Combinations from frame to 
frame appear random and narrative is subsumed by perplexing fragments of a journey cut 
together. This is because the robot’s neural networks are discrete and thus unable to master a 
linear or continuous understanding of time. The compositional heuristics that control its 
aesthetic output result in frames appearing to jump and stutter as the narrative of the film 
progresses. To the computer this is not noise but ‘good’ filmmaking - it follows the rules. To 
human viewers the films glitch and move unpredictably between what seem to be fast-
forward and rewind modes in a kind of kind of stop-start aesthetic, once thought to be lost 
with the demise of the VCR. The networked creation of the work, and the reception of it 
within the gallery distribute the social and cultural frameworks of representation beyond that 
expected in the substitution of a human for a machine. It introduces something new. The 
films created by the robot contain elements not predicted by Bagnall, and not necessarily 
expected by the properties of the system it enacts.  
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The Film-making Robot emphasises the multiple material tendencies that occur in the 
production of machine aesthetics. These tendencies include: the materiality of the digital 
itself – information, the materiality of meaning production – language, and, the materiality of 
aesthetic reception – culture. In order to function the Film-making Robot is completely 
dependant on the operations of information transmission; it must film, upload, download, 
compose and output using the digital languages and properties of information. The networks 
of information introduce a second layer to the work.  Rather than creating or presenting 
discrete objects the Film-making Robot uses the tools of information transmission to establish 
aesthetic relationships between differing material bodies, images, representations, and spaces. 
As soon as the Film-making Robot goes out on the streets the presence of noise means that 
repetition is impossible, its information remains mutable. It makes films that are noisy, 
glitchy, and apparently full of error. The films themselves may be an output, but they are not 
the whole work. 
 
The Cloud Shape Classifier 
 
The second of Bagnall’s works I discuss here does not have the same mobility as the Film-
making Robot, but uses many of the same heuristics to question the specifics of human 
aesthetics. It does this by expanding the capacities of the digital to include networked human 
interactants. The Cloud Shape Classifier (2006) is a robot camera that looks out of a gallery 
window at the clouds in the sky. Every few seconds it takes a photograph that is uploaded to 
a networked database from which humans can choose and save their favourite cloud 
photograph into an online account (called a classifier). (Bagnall uses the terminology ‘Cloud 
Shape Classifier’ (large ‘C’) to discuss the work as a whole and ‘classifier’ (small ‘c’) to 
discuss the operations of the individual image groupings.) Cloud Shape Classifier is 
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distributed between a website, a mobile gallery location, and a fixed camera. The camera 
points out the window of Enjoy Gallery in Wellington, New Zealand. The gallery the work is 
exhibited in can be anywhere in the world (the installation includes a digital projection of the 
‘most liked clouds ever’), and the website allows human users to log in when ever they need 
from where ever they are. Ostensibly, the Cloud Shape Classifier is a tool for the 
overworked, perhaps directed at those who spend too much time looking at art rather than 
gazing at clouds. For some, checking for cloud updates can become as compulsive as 
checking Facebook updates. 
This website can help you to find images of clouds you like. If you spend a short while teaching it, it 
will keep watch of the sky for you and show you good clouds you might otherwise miss. … 
Cloud Shape Classifier can be trained on your own, or collectively through the shared classifiers. 
Within the gallery space, the machine will present clouds it knows are similar to those chosen as 
collective favourites, with the opportunity also for visitors to continue training the machine and 
refining the best cloud ever (Bagnall, 2006). 
 
Cloud Shape Classifier differs from Film-making Robot in that it does not rely on the 
physical distribution of its own body, but on the distributed interactions of viewers, who take 
on the role of advisors in assisting the computer to generate lists of ‘favourites’. Unlike the 
Film-making Robot the Cloud Shape Classifier does not make its own aesthetic judgements; 
it learns by way of the instructions/ decisions made by human viewers. The classifiers do not 
have their own taste. Instead, as servants for contemplation they seek to please the registered 
viewer. Through careful training the classifier can anticipate the sorts of clouds that the 
human viewer prefers. For example, each time a viewer logs in, the classifier will suggest 
photos that have been gathered and not yet viewed, but that it considers may fit the viewer’s 
previous aesthetic choices. 
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To save people time in the search for interesting clouds, a computer watches the sky all day, every day. 
Viewers can interact with the computer via the Internet. It establishes individual relationships with 
each person, developing an idea of the kinds of clouds they like. When they return to the site they are 
shown the clouds that have passed that would have been their favourites. Their reactions help refine the 
computer's idea of their taste. It will also show the greatest clouds by popular opinion. (Bagnall, 2006) 
 
Over time viewers can spend their evenings training the classifier to do aesthetic labour for 
them. Because of the specificity of the interaction, any notion of an overarching cultural or 
social aesthetic image is rendered questionable and turned back into a matter of individual 
pleasure. Because of its need to please, and despite apparently keeping track of repeated 
favourites, the classifier may decide that according to the information it has received the most 
popular cloud has in fact ‘not been seen by humans’ (Bagnall, 2006). In this, the computer 
demonstrates how aesthetic decisions are individual yet not isolated. Through a process that 
seeks to numerically eliminate anything that might appear noisy, ugly or un-aesthetic, the 
Cloud Shape Classifier aims to generate pleasing sets of images targeted to individual users. 
In this world of outsourced aesthetic analysis where, like in any global market, decisions are 
distributed to those with less power (the computer) before being returned to an individual 
user (the human), only a concerted effort on the part of the viewer will enable an individual 
‘classifier’ or set of images to begin to distinguish itself from others. 
 
 The use of fixed aesthetic algorithms to classify the clouds does not mean that the work is 
fully determined because the qualifiers used continue to change over time. The work emerges 
as more and more clouds are photographed and presented to be classified, or as new 
classifiers are added to the mix and new aesthetic criteria introduced by individual viewers. 
The introduction of time as a material means that the Cloud Shape Classifier presents the 
aesthetic experience as an emergent event. This mix of materials: cloud, image, classifier, 
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viewer, time, training, and computer system do not result in a fixed media-specific aesthetic 
experience, but a continual real-time system of aesthetic redefinition (Burnham, 1969). 
 
Initially, the Cloud Shape Classifier reads like a description of the ultimate modern aesthetic 
machine; one able to separate the construction of an aesthetic experience from the subjective 
viewer and feed it back to them at appropriate moments. Cloud Shape Classifier combines 
information and noise in a pattern that networked viewers control in terms of both form and 
material. It is the history of globalised media reception, perception and aesthetics that 
Bagnall’s Cloud Shape Classifier engages. The Cloud Shape Classifier manages time and 
information as materials in the construction of the human aesthetic experience. Rather than 
reasserting the historical divisions of aesthetic judgment and criteria, the Cloud Shape 
Classifier delays the immediacy of the visual experience and as a result highlights the 
historical fallacy of aesthetic sensibilities.  
 
Where and when aesthetic choice enters a machine, (or any other classification system) an 
illusion of objectivity arises. At their most everyday aesthetics are today embodied in the 
ubiquitous ‘like’ button. ‘Liking’ is the visible evidence of spontaneous clicking by viewers 
that not only asserts an aesthetic position, but shares that position with others. In the process 
of sharing certain ‘likes’ emerge repeatedly. The ‘like’ has something particular to do with 
media and the way in which media structure content, for example YouTube operates as a 
media for cute cat videos. However these ‘likes’ belong to the human and not the machine. 
To address more exactly the place of the machine aesthetic in the twenty-first century it is 
necessary to retrace the steps that lead to the development of digital machines. 
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Information and digital matter 
 
The movement in art from the aesthetics of a stable object towards that of real-time 
process began in the 1940s with the development of digital machines and then reached a 
key moment in the 1960s with the introduction of informational materials to the art 
gallery. Machine aesthetics are the result of this history of informational and digital 
machines. The history is what gives Bagnall’s works their specific operations and 
properties.  
 
From the late 1940s theorists in both America and Europe working with concepts of 
information and cybernetics began to generate information ‘systems’ that tended towards 
the digital (Hayles, 1990; Wiener, 1961; von Baeyer, 2004). The resolution of the digital 
into a single system initially relied on the binary digits of zero and one; these were its 
properties. Zero and one were put to work and numerous material devices developed 
which could speed up their operations. Very quickly, the binary encoding became 
ubiquitous (and in popular culture today is often seen to represent the only language of 
the digital). In the influential model of information transmission proposed by Shannon 
and Weaver in 1949, a sender encodes a message that travels through a channel 
encountering disruption and noise along the way. A receiver then decodes the message 
and information (but not necessarily meaning) has been transmitted. Information, defined 
as both probability and improbability, had no direct relationship to meaning; instead it 
was simply a ‘bit’ measure (Shannon, 1948: 379). Shannon offered a structural and, for 
his purposes, pragmatic definition of information, the concern was with the material 
operations of information, and noise was something to be eliminated, or at best overcome 
(Weaver and Shannon, 1963; von Baeyer, 2004). A binary code was chosen because it 
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utilised the smallest possible number of resources, and thus demonstrated efficient 
storage, transmission and processing of information, which could simultaneously be 
assessed for its accuracy, but not necessarily for its meaning. Formatted for a single 
sender and receiver information was materialised through relationships with noise; that 
is, entropy (noise within the message) and interference (noise from outside the message) 
(Hayles, 1990: 55). Noise is not independent of the system, but one of the materials that 
constitute the system and its relations. To enable more efficient message transmission 
Shannon designed systems that controlled as much noise as possible, whilst also 
acknowledging that without some noise, information could not be transmitted. It is this 
constitutive role of noise that gives information its surprisingly mutable nature. 
 
Shannon understood that information needed to be replicable, but that repetition did not add 
anything to the information content of a message, and was in fact an impediment to smooth 
transmission. In Shannon's formulation, repetition is redundancy. Furthermore, he considered 
pure information to be predictable, and thus not actually information at all. If I tell you 
something you already know, no information has been transmitted. Too much information is 
redundant and theoretically not essential to the transmission of a message. To constitute a 
message, a transmission must contain a mixture of pattern and noise with a minimum of 
repetition. If noise is the materiality of information, then we understand Shannon by what 
information is. If we add to this the way that the information (as noise, as materiality) 
operates, we begin to understand what it does. Defined in this way information was too 
important and rich a ‘discovery’ for it to stay put for long, and information science began 
almost immediately to haunt aesthetics.  
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Shows like Jack Burnham’s “Software” (1970, Jewish Museum, New York) and Jasia 
Reichardt’s “Cybernetic Serendipity” (1968, ICA, London) opened up material and aesthetic 
spaces for the aesthetic understanding of information within the art gallery. Primarily the 
connection between art and information science was read as a concern with the material 
spaces of transmission – whether practical, conceptual, social or critical. In the 1960s 
Burnham suggested that real-time activities were crucial to the system that is art (1969: 50). 
Burnham used the language of cybernetics to suggest that machines when connected with 
other machines had the potential to “work, … affect matter and involve man in their doings 
more everyday” (1968: 321). These connected machines, he suggested, could elicit 
behavioural responses similar to any ‘natural’ system. In 1970 he wrote: 
Information processing technology influences our notions about creativity, 
perception and the limits of art. … It … is probably not the province of 
computers and other telecommunication devices to produce works of art as we 
know it; but they will, in fact be instrumental in redefining the entire area of 
esthetic awareness. (Shanken, 1998) 
 
As Burnham predicted, digitization introduced a new set of materials to our relations 
with objects, things and images that resulted not only in the loss of the human’s position 
at the centre of an aesthetic universe, but the redefinition of the entire area of aesthetic 
awareness via the capacity of the machine. Burnham stopped short of claiming machinic 
creativity as an aspect of this new aesthetic environment. 
 
Picking up the story again in the introduction to The Digital Dialectic, Peter Lunenfeld 
suggests that the impact of the digital on representational media is found in the recasting 
of ‘everything’ as ‘digital information.’ Consequently, everything can be ‘stored, 
accessed, and controlled by the same equipment’ (2000: xvi). For Lunenfeld, the digital 
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does not represent a technology or a process, but an operational ‘similarity at the level of 
binary coding’ (2000: xvi). Lunenfeld wants to capture this property of the digital, as he 
sees it representing a change in the very way humans negotiate the world. The change 
that interests Lunenfeld is not necessarily in the materials that make up the digital and its 
codes, but in the impact of these on human reception and understanding. Like Burnham, 
he argues that digital properties contribute specific challenges to aesthetics. 
Representational change is not just about a shift in information production and reception, 
and cannot solely rely on the operations of the zero and one of the digital binary, as if 
these two elements always behave appropriately, falling neatly into place and forming 
unimaginably complex patterns that make digital things go. Although everything can be 
stored, accessed and controlled by the same equipment, this does not mean that humans 
retain sole rights to unlimited and uninterrupted access, storage or control. Lunenfeld 
opens a space where the greatest impact of the digital is the emergence of aesthetics in 
machines.  
 
Emergence and mutation in aesthetics 
 
The zeros and ones of Lunenfeld’s description are the properties of the digital, they 
define its shape, but not necessarily its behaviours. Individually they follow rules; they 
are not emergent (DeLanda, 2011, p.23). As soon as these properties start interacting 
with other properties they open up the capacity of the digital: it is the capacity of the 
digital that takes it beyond a state into an event. This is where Bagnall’s works begin to 
demonstrate that something more than Shannon’s model of information transmission is 
going on, and this ‘something more’ is in tension with the fundamental materials of the 
digital. The capacity of the digital depends on its fixed properties, without zeros and ones 
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the digital would not exist. The digital itself cannot emerge. For example, the robot 
composes films within an aesthetic ecology that is machinic, based on the properties of 
the zero and one, and consequently reliant on relationships between information and 
noise. These properties contain tendencies. For an informational machine one of these 
tendencies is toward the necessity to define information from noise. The machine’s 
definition is neither visual nor ‘aesthetic’ but informational, and based on the nature and 
history of its own neural networks. The robot’s nature means that in order to function it 
must obey the rules of information transmission established by Shannon and Weaver and 
strive to create information freed from noise. However, digital capacities are events that 
together make up the tendency of the digital to form machines as part of an active 
assemblage with humans. In the formation of machines, affecting and influencing other 
kinds of matter, emergence occurs.  
 
Lunenfeld defines the possibilities where, through a focus on the particularity of the digital 
(its properties), the emergence of machinic capacities may indeed include aesthetics. 
Bagnall’s works take one step further and claim a place for machine aesthetics. Both the 
works discussed here depend on the programming of their respective digital systems to recast 
‘everything’ as digital. However, there is more to these works than a straightforward reliance 
on, or presentation of digital technologies as technologies and ‘everything’ as digital. 
Because of a joint reliance on the behaviours of information and aesthetics, these works 
demonstrate the emergent forces of digital capacities, rather than the fixed properties of 
digital binaries, as key to understanding things digital. Bagnall’s machines are not the 
biological hybrids imagined by Capek, or the mimetic automatons of Drot, but are digital 
assemblages that include the aesthetic decision making tools previously held only by human 
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creatures. In this, they also expand Lunenfeld’s definition of the digital to include 
representational and perceptual operations beyond the zero and the one.  
 
If these works really do move beyond the zero and one (but not completely escape it) they 
leave behind them a tension in the way that information might contribute to the 
understanding of machine aesthetics. As I have suggested, the process of emergence 
generates new aesthetic engagements that themselves contribute other potentialities for 
emergence within the ever-shifting viscosity of the work. In Cloud Shape Classifier and 
Film-making Robot this occurs through a process that treats aesthetics and information as the 
same property when the works are in training. Because of this informational attitude to 
aesthetics, Bagnall’s works expose aesthetics as an emergent property of art, and not a fixed 
system of classification. Aesthetics becomes an emergent media form through which the 
human and the machine interact. To resolve the slippage that is occurring between machine, 
human, information and aesthetic it is necessary to address emergence from a different 
perspective before returning one last time to the works themselves. 
 
Emergence is a tendency of information systems. Shifting the ground from a consideration of 
biological systems to technical and informational ones, Norbert Wiener argued that the 
fundamental law of emergence is that the behaviour of individual agents is less important 
than that of the overall system (Wiener, 1961). Jack Burnham used Wiener’s ideas of 
emergence to articulate an approach to real-time systems in art. Burnham quotes Hans 
Haake’s (1969) ‘untitled statement’: 
A 'sculpture' that physically reacts to its environment is no longer to be regarded as an object. The 
range of outside factors affecting it, as well as its own radius of action, reach beyond the space it 
materially occupies. It thus merges with the environment in a relationship that is better understood as a 
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'system' of interdependent processes. These processes evolve without the viewer's empathy. He 
becomes a witness. A system is not imagined, it is real. (Burnham, 1968) 
 
Haake and Burnham describe the artwork as an information and aesthetic system that is 
greater than the occupation of material space, and can occur with or without the viewer. The 
real-time identified by Burnham is essential to thinking through the possibilities of 
emergence within informational and binary forms such as Bagnall’s aesthetic machines. 
 
Literary critic Katherine Hayles suggests that media are structures that are shaped and 
produced by their use and content (2003: 6, 33). Hayles uses emergence as both a description 
and a methodology for our encounter with hypertextual media (2003: 33; Hayles, 1999). 
Hayles connects media with emergence through the operations of what she terms, ‘flickering 
signification’ (1999: 46). Emergent properties are tied to the work’s materiality and are part 
of the experience of viewing. When Hayles looks at hypertext she sees patterns (such as the 
binary ‘0’ ‘1’ ‘0’ ‘1’) resulting in a situation whereby ‘any symbol can appear in any 
position’ (1999: 32). Problematically, this means that pattern cannot invite or contain 
mutation, simply more pattern. In other words, the pattern will tend toward the periodic, and 
the shifting pattern of the pattern will overrule any potential mutation. This is a problem 
because mutation is essential if a text is to emerge, or contain emergent properties. As Hayles 
explains: 
 
‘Mutation normally occurs when some random event…disrupts an existing pattern 
and something else is put in place instead’ (1999: 32-3).  That something else has to be more 
than the original, for example a mutation of ‘0’ ‘1’ ‘0’ ‘1’ might be ‘0’ ‘1’ ‘k’ ‘0’ ‘x’  ‘1’. 
Mutation is thus the ‘bifurcation point’ between pattern and randomness (Hayles, 1999: 33). 
It is here that a system can emerge. Once mutation occurs the pattern is never the same, and 
as a result, we can only understand the passing of pattern through mutation. Hayles turns the 
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equation around: ‘The randomness to which mutation testifies is implicit in the very idea of 
pattern, for only against the background of nonpattern can pattern emerge’ (1999: 33). Pattern 
becomes a kind of analogical end-point, and mutation the aesthetic moment. As Hayles 
makes clear, mutation as a process or vehicle for change puts ‘something else’ in place 
(1999: 32-3).  
 
In Hayles’ equation it seems that every pattern tends towards mutation. So, where is mutation 
located? Is it in between patterns, is it in the reception of the pattern, or as Lunenfeld 
suggests, does it remain locked in a binary relationship with pattern? To invoke pattern in 
Bagnall’s works also takes us back to the material properties of the digital. Not to the zero 
and one of code, but to the pixel of the digital image. To make their aesthetic decisions, the 
robot and the classifier both use pattern to read pixels as numbers. A pixel is a picture 
element, the result of visual atomism – the breaking of digital images into chunks. In itself 
the pixel does not contain information. It is only in relationship to other pixels that the pixel 
begins to occupy a visual space and can be read as information. And because information 
contains and is formed from noise, no single pixel is a pure information space. As New 
Zealand artist Stella Brennan writes: ‘A dirty pixel is no longer an uninflected container of 
information; it has its own, corrupted character’ (2002: 2). For the visual digital image the 
pixel can be considered the final frontier. No matter how small it gets, the pixel remains a 
determining aspect of the visual experience of the image. The pixel however does not mutate. 
Mutation occurs in the patterns of information, aesthetics and perception contained within the 
pixel. In this sense the mutation is implicitly linked with noise, rather than with a (perhaps 
more familiar) biological understanding. It is more like the weather patterns that are reflected 
in the clouds watched by the robot. Prone to frequent change and alternation the weather is 
inconsistent, mutable. Mutability is not accidental change, error, or random variation. It is 
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found within the complex contingencies of machine learning, human input and the visual 
source material. 
 
One final way to think about the formation of machine aesthetics via emergence and mutation 
is to think about the way the works function as distributed assemblages rather than as 
complete material entities (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 91). To suggest that Bagnall’s works 
are assemblages does not mean that they become fixed. In his argument about the historical 
processes that make up any material entity Manuel Delanda (2011) revives a discussion of 
the properties, capacities, and tendencies of materials. It is this approach that has parallels 
with those of new aesthetics: things are not reduced to their types but tendencies and 
relationships between informational materials and aesthetics are highlighted. Emergence is a 
tendency of these informational aesthetic systems that are defined by rules (faithfully 
followed) but where global outcomes exceed the local rules. In Delanda’s understanding 
mutation and repetition are two material processes that may occur at different temporal and 
physical scales. Perceiving these processes opens up the assemblage to a further process of 
‘relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations’ (Deleuze, 1990: 31). This 
approach reminds us that perception has never been a simple one-way view out from a 
subject. Deleuze explains that ‘perception is not the object plus something, but the object 
minus something, minus everything that does not interest us’ (1990: 25). Deleanda’s complex 
assemblages always in-formation, plus Deleuze’s selective and relational process of 
perception, together parallel the process Shannon anticipated for information transmission 
and reception. It is also the process shared by the robot, the classifier, and the human viewer 
as they assess the images before them. 
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Cloud Shape Classifier is one such emergent informatic assemblage. Emergence occurs in a 
number of locations within the work. The photographs of clouds (although containing 
individual aesthetic triggers) are less important than the system or process of classification 
and the informational choices made as each cloud is addressed. The final set is only 
provisional, and only existent within a particular classifier. The material of classification can 
quickly shift form and another classifier emerge. This emergent process is not something 
special or new, it is part and parcel of the work being informational. Cloud Shape Classifier 
and Film-making Robot share emergence – as both a property of the individual parts and as a 
kind of meta-system – with other informational works. The impact of emergence within 
informatic systems and consequently within art that engages such systems, highlights 
transformation, uncertainty, and the mutability of aesthetics. However it is important to 
remember that although emergence might complicate simplistic ideas about linear causality 
there’s nothing inherently unpredictable about emergence in digital contexts. Shifting 
relationships between pattern and mutation control the individual classifiers of the Cloud 
Shape Classifier as aesthetics are fragmented. There is variation and change, but that change 
is accommodated by the work’s code and software, it is incorporated into the digital. Cloud 
Shape Classifier illustrates mutability but not as a result of break down, rather it shows how 
mutability can occur through the faithful functioning of the digital. 
 
The discrete and non-periodic operations of digital emergence mean that there is no endpoint 
at which the work can be said to be complete; to have emerged and reached a point of 
aesthetic resolution. Even if one classifier is fully trained, there is the potential for exactly the 
same cloud to be given a different ‘rating’ by another classifier. Not all ‘likes’ are equal. The 
shift that occurs is in the aesthetic parameters of the classification, where beauty is only 
temporarily in the eye of the beholder. What emerges is a series of specific and particular 
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understandings of the aesthetic experience of gazing at clouds, all obtained without the 
explicit necessity of the ‘cloud’ itself. Furthermore, because this experience is always 
emergent and never resolved, the Cloud Shape Classifier never gives us the ‘ahhh’ of a 
perfect aesthetic cloud-moment. Tomorrow will bring a better, more pleasing, like-able 
cloud. This is the paradox that the Cloud Shaped Classifier shares with the Film-making 
Robot. They are both network-based classifiers operating through machine learning 
algorithms which offer a probabilistic, statistically based form of reasoning – beautiful or 
ugly, near or far. The experience of this structure highlights the unpredictability of any form 
of aesthetic classification whether human or machine. Aesthetics is shown to be much more 
than a fixed structure of taste belonging to the social subjects called humans. Nonetheless 
some viewers will not believe that the robot has been left alone to make its films, arguing that 
they are ‘too beautiful,’ or ‘a robot couldn’t do that, he’s cheating’. [2] 
 
The Film-making Robot makes films by engaging the digital materials of time, information 
and noise. Viewers experience the finished films as aesthetic objects. The Cloud Shape 
Classifier also works with learnt informational patterns as it analyses and selects ‘good’ 
images of clouds on behalf of its viewers. In a context within which everything has been 
recast as digital, have these two works genuinely effected some form of representational 
change? Is this ‘new aesthetics’? Within the ecology of film-making and reception the Film-
making Robot efficiently distributes the properties and capacities of film-making in such a 
way that it is possible for unique films to be composed by a robot within a single 24 hour 
period. Similarly, the Cloud Shape Classifier uses aesthetic criteria to shift collective 
definitions of aesthetics. Each work shifts the spaces of aesthetic reception outside the gallery 
and into networked social ecologies. The robot eye travels the streets that its viewers watch 
from the gallery, and the classifier eye stares out the window of a gallery while its viewers 
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approach it from any suitable networked location. Both works enable robots to make 
independent aesthetic decisions, and present these to audiences who accept the outputs as 
appropriate within gallery contexts. Neither work is an artificial intelligence; they do 
however ‘perceive’. The Film-making Robot composes films. The Cloud Shape Classifier 
anticipates the aesthetic choices of its viewers. Both works record what they see digitally and 
together they stockpile time as a material. In this space of mechanised perception the 




To end this essay I want to suggest that these two works by Douglas Bagnall might reflect 
aspects of a broader and more complex ethico-aesthetic experience that is currently being 
described as ‘new aesthetics’. The experience of ‘new aesthetics’ occurs through the coming 
together of machine and aesthetics in a specific kind of machinic assemblage. This 
assemblage is not only made from multiple and various components, but operates within a 
fluid and often unequal field (Guattari, 2000: 68). New aesthetics demonstrates how 
perception is interactive and complex as the human viewer distinguishes between information 
and noise, beauty and whatever its opposite might be.  Bagnall’s works utilise algorithmic 
processes and turn them into aesthetic tools. In the material distribution of the Cloud Shape 
Classifier and the Film-making Robot the gallery environment is opened up to mutable 
informatic and aesthetic systems. As a result, the operations of information and aesthetics are 
found to be very similar. This is because both are the result of the capacities of the digital. 
Simultaneously both works distribute the space of the work and the space of the gallery. The 
viewer of clouds occupies an online environment specially constructed for cloud sorting, and 
the eyes of the robot travel through a city leaving the viewer in the gallery with the final 
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result of its activities. As infomatic and machinic systems both works operate within a 
contemporary visual environment, within which viewers are already familiar with the layered 
positions of information and aesthetics. 
 
Until recently machine aesthetics were considered shorthand for a fascination or 
celebration of the machine, a kind of techno-utopianism. In 2012 the phrase ‘new 
aesthetics’ arose, firstly as a response to the kinds of images that contemporary machines 
seem to be producing and secondly to the redefinitions of aesthetic awareness that these 
networked aesthetic machines seem to be suggesting (Bogost, 2012). Human experience 
and the study of the senses is being repositioned away from the centre and the machines 
that surround humans do appear to be capable of producing works of art (Bennett, 2010: 
21). Through their enforced material distribution, the Film-making Robot and the Cloud 
Shape Classifier activate the aesthetic grounds of the machine. As the Cloud Shape 
Classifier looks out the window it encounters both information and noise. When we 
watch a film made by the Film-making Robot what we see is a film of vibrating 
perceptive decisions based not on the digital but on the flickering on and off of machinic 
aesthetics. The experience of both works shifts from a remembered event full of glitches 
and stammering, to a distributed recording (or collection) able to be manipulated on 
demand, forever. 
 
In the Software exhibition Jack Burnham wanted to ‘produce aesthetic sensations without the 
intervening “object”’ (Shanken, 1998). The method for this was to introduce systems beyond 
those of ‘art’ and to use ‘software’ as both a conceptual and literal way to make things 
happen. In the 1960s the system had the potential to be conceived as a medium. In this essay 
I have suggested that the equation is not so simple. In Bagnall’s works the system is not a 
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medium, but is a way of linking the informatic with the aesthetic.  As machinic assemblages 
Bagnall’s works challenge the pre-modern idea that only humans possess aesthetic capacities, 
at the same time as operate as foretellers of the ‘new aesthetic’ understandings of machinic 
vision. 
 
Manuel DeLanda (2011) outlined the possible mechanisms of emergence within specific 
entities through an analysis of the properties, capacities, and tendencies of materials. Through 
this essay I have utilised this materialist view to help me further define what a machine 
aesthetic might be, and the impacts it may engender. I have addressed the limitations of a 
property-based understanding of the digital. I have suggested instead that understanding the 
digital through its capacities and tendencies that are both aesthetic and informational 
determines not only the viewer’s understanding of the artwork but also what that artwork is. 
In addition, this approach to aesthetics and information implies that it is not possible for 
digital artworks to be understood as singular and fixed objects external to their viewers and 
the systems they embody in. Together Bagnall’s aesthetic machines suggest that we consider 
how aesthetics form provisionally from emergent capacities. Of course, this is what watching 




[1] It is worth noting that when this work was invited to show at ISEA2006 in San Jose it did 
not work because of the lack of free wireless hubs in the centre of Silicon Valley – the 
birthplace of much technology the robot is made from. Like Donna Haraway’s (1991) cyborg 
its evolutionary myth did not allow access to the gates of Eden. 
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[2] When I presented a discussion of Bagnall’s works at DAC2007 in Perth Australia 
an audience member took offence, saying both I and Bagnall were cheating and 
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